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DEMA.~D L~CERTAINTY &~D PRICE STABILIZATION 
l. Introduction 
Price stabilization is an important policy goal of government 
intervention in competitive markets. These policies are primarily 
directed at raising producer income and stabilizing market prices 
at levels acceptable to consumers and producers (Fox [1956], Turnovsky 
[1978], Newbery and Stiglitz .[1979]). Many of the stabilization 
policy results have been developed from the study of agricultural 
commodity markets. In these markets, prices tend to be highly variable 
due to uncertain and inelastic supply and demand (Schultz [1945], 
Gardner [1981]). 
Benefits and costs of price stabilization policies have been 
studied extensively. 1 Broadly speaking, these analyses have been 
for either the individual producer/consumer (e.g. Waugh [1944], Oi 
[1961], Pope, Chavas and Just [1983]) or market level responses 
(Massell [1969], Turnovsky [1976], Samuelson [1972]). Recently, 
the linkages between implications of stabilization policy impacts 
at micro and market levels have been explored systematically. However, 
with the exception of Kawai [1983], the results are limited to supply 
uncertainty (Newbery and Stiglitz [1979,1981], Wright [1979], Wright 
and Williams [1982]). 2 
This paper develops a framework for efficient price stabilization 
under demand uncertainty. Similar to Newbery and Stiglitz [1979] and 
Wright [1979], a rational expectations equilibrium model is employed. 
Stabilization poli~ies may reflect whether the commodity is perishable 
or storable (Fox [l951a,l95lb]). Following Kawai [1983], we assume that 
2 
the commodity is nonstorable. Hence, the government or stabilization 
agency does not arbitrage in the commodity or hold inventories as 
buffer stocks. Instead, direct subsidies (taxes) are used to assure 
a minimum price for voluntary participants. To regulate excessive 
supply, a capacity restriction is imposed on the participating producers. 
The plan of this paper is as follows .. Section 2 describes a 
stylized stabilization program with voluntary participation. A 
rational expectations equilibrium model incorporating this stabilization 
program is then developed. Section 3 shows how stabilization policy 
parameters affect producer participation and factor intensity. In 
Section 4, risk premiums and factor use levels are aggregated and 
used to investigate the impacts of changes in stabilization policy 
parameters on market supply response. Section 5 provides an analysis 
of how certainty equivalent producer income are affected by program 
parameters. Section 6 introduces government cost and the efficiency 
of stabilization policies. A brief summary and some concluding 
remarks are contained in Section 7. 
3 
2. Government Intervention and Market Equilibrium 
Consider a competitive industry producing a homogeneous commodity. 
Market demand is assumed stochastic and given by 
p p(Q,u), ()p/<:Q < 0 
where p, Q and u denote market price, output and a random variable 
with a distribution function H(u), respectively. For a particular 
market output Q, the distribution H(u) completely determines a price 
distribution F(pjQ). The expected inverse demand function is given by 
"' "' 
p(Q) = J pdF(pjQ) = jp(Q,u)dH(u). 
0 -oo 
When the market price is uncertain, producers may sell their outputs 
at a high price but also face the risk of selling at a low price. 
Baron [1970] and Sandmo [1971] have shown that for a given price 
distribution, a risk averse firm will produce less than if the mean 
price were known with certainty. 
Consider the stylized stabilization policy (a,p ) where a is an 
m 
acreage (capacity) parameter representing the portion of land cultivated 
by participating producers, 0 < a< l, and p is a guaranteed minimum 
m 
4 price. Since the commodity is not storable, the government uses a 
direct subsidy to assumre the minimum price for the participants. 
Assume that participation in a goverment stabilization program is 
voluntary, but that partial participation is not allowed. Nonparticipants 
sell at the random market price p with distribution F(pjQ), whereas 
participants receive a random price v with distribution G(vjQ). 
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To distinguish .between F(p[Q) and G(v[Q), observe that the 
participant receives v = pm' implying a per unit subsidy of (pm- p). 
Thus, the minimum price truncates the distribution F(pjQ) at pm' 
eliminating the downside price risk. For market prices above pm' 
v = p. Thus, the probability density function of the price v for 
the participants, g(v[Q) =G'(v[Q), is obtained by truncating that. 
of the market price f(p[Q) = F'(p[Q) at p . That is 
m 
F(pm[Q) for v = Pm 
g(v[Q) = f(p[Q) for v p > pm 
0 for v < p . 
m 
Participation 
Voluntary participation has been a common feature of stabilization 
programs in U.S. agricultural commodity markets. Consider the 
participation decision of an individual firm. The production function 
is assumed to be identical for all producers. However, producers 
can be different in their attitudes toward risk. The production 
function for firm i is 
where qi is output, Ki is a nonland input and Li is land. This 
production function q(.), common to all producers, is assumed monotone 
increasing, quasiconcave and linearly homogeneous to permit the 
aggregation of firm output. 
5 
Let v = JvdG(viQe) and p = fpdF(piQe) be the conditional expected 
prices for participants and nonparticipants, respectively, where Qe 
is the estimated industry output. Let w and r denote the prices of 
the land and nonland inputs. Although the land price is ultimately 
endogenously determined in our market equilibrium framework, each 
producer is assumed to be a price taker in the factor markets. 
Note that in the production function, L. denotes the land actually 
~ 
utilized by producer i. Due to the acreage restriction, a participant 
using L. units of land must control (L./a) units of land. 
~ ~ 
For participant i, the expected utility of profit is 
i U [vq(K. ,L.) 
~ ~ 
where Ui(.) is a monotone increasing and concave von Neumann-Morgenstern 
i i -1{ i} 
utility function, and P = (U ) EU is. certainty equivalent (CE) 
profit. The CE profit can be explicitly written as 
where R. is the Arrow-Pratt risk premium. 
~ 
(l) 
is concave, R: 
~ 
must be positive for all nondegenerate price distributions. Similarly, 
the expected utility of a nonparticipant j is 
"' 
EUj _ f Uj[pq(K.,L.) 
0 J J 
where Nj _ (Uj)-l{EUj} is CE profit of the nonparticipant. More 
explicitly, 
R. 
J 
where R. is the risk premium. The ith producer participates in the 
J 
stabilization program if max Pi >max Ni, and not participate if 
i i 
l!laX P < max N • 
Rational Expectations Equilibrium 
In their seminal papers Baron [1970] and Sandmo [1971] analyzed 
how uncertain prices affect the output decision of a risk averse 
competitive firm. In these studies, the producer is a stochastic 
price taker and makes production decisions before the market price 
is known. Although uncertain about the market price, the producer 
is presumed either to know the price distribution F(p) or to use 
a subjective price distribution Fe(p). Thus, ex ante firm output 
depends on the distributon of the market prices, although it is 
independent of the market price ultimately revealed. 
Critical to many of the results on the ex ~ production model 
is the idea of rational expectations. For market equilibrium to 
be workable, the competitive firms must be capable of confirming 
their subjective price distributions ex post. Subjective price 
distributions and output levels are revised simultaneously. 
Newbery and Stiglitz [1981] suggest that, for the market to be 
6 
( 2) 
in (short run) equilibrium, the firms must have rational expectations, 
i.e., the subjective and actual price distributions must be equal. 
If the actual price distribution deviates from the subjective price 
distribution, firms will adjust their outputs accordingly. Hence, 
the market will not be in equilibrium except if by perchance the output 
i 
adjustments of firms happen to cancel one another. Once firms confirm 
their rational price expectations, further output adjustment is not 
stimulated and the market is in equilibrium. 
However, it is not a simple task to verify that expectations 
are rational. At the end of the period, when the market price is 
realized, the firms observe only a single market clearing price, not 
the distribution F(p). If the competitive firms were to confirm 
the distribution of market prices by this process, it would require 
repeated experiments. This confirmation procedure may not be tolerably 
timely in agricultural commodity markets with a production period of 
one year. Thus, indirect and more timely methods of confirming price 
expectations are necessary, if rational expectations are to be tractable 
in modeling ex ante production in competitive markets. 
The price distribution FCpiQ) is conditional on industry output Q. 
We assume that the competitive firms use their subjective estimates of 
mean industry output Qe to form subjective conditional price distributions 
F(p)e = F(p1Qe). 6 Since there are many price distributions with positive 
probabilities for any realized market price, the firms do not use 
the observed market price to evaluate their subjective price distributions. 
Instead, they compare the actual output and their subjective estimates 
of mean industry output. If different, these firms revise their industry 
output estimates and adjust the conditional price distributions accordingly. 
A sufficient condition for short run market equilibrium is that each 
firm's subjective estimate of market output degenerates at Q. Expected 
utility maximization leads the firms to revise their subjective estimates 
consistent with the equilibrium output Q. 
Price Stabilization and Market Supply 
Participation and production decisions are based on the price 
distributions, G(v!Qe) and F(p!Qe), conditional on estimates Qe of 
8 
industry output. In addition, the output of a participant is directly 
affected by the policy parameters, a and Pm· Hence, for each participant 
it:. lP, optimal output can be written q. 
~ 
e 
= qi (Q ;a,pm) · Similarly, 
e for each nonparticipant j t:. H , optimal output is q. = qJ, (Q ) . 
J . 
Let 
X = L q. and Y = L q., respectively, denote the total output of 
iElP~ jt:.N: J 
the participants and the nonparticipants. The market supply function 
is 
e e - e ) Q = X(Q ;a,p ) + Y(Q ) = h(Q ;a,p • 
m m 
(3) 
When the market is not in equilibrium the firms may have different 
estimates of market output. Since firms can verify their subjective 
price distributions ex post, market equilibrium requires that all firms 
have identical and correct price distribution, F(p!Qe) = F(p!Q), 5 or 
more simply 
Q. ( 4) 
That is, for each firm Qe degenerates at Q. The rational expectations 
e 
equilibrium output is thus the fixed point of the mapping h(Q ;a,p ) . 
m 
The solution to (3) and (4) can be written as 
(5) 
Intuitively, expression (5) shows that the government can manipulate 
industry output by changing the program parameters. In the absence of 
government intervention, a 
free market equilibrium. 
~ 1 and p 
m 
9 
0. Thus, Q(l,O) defines the 
Figure l illustrates how supply response and market equilibrium 
are derived for a binary random demand function. The upper panel 
depics random market demands with two states of the world, u1 and u 2, 
each with equal probability. The corresponding demand curves are. 
denoted by o1 and o2, with expected (inverse) demand schedule D. 
The lower panel is a graphic representation of equations (3) and (4). 
- e To show how the supply curve S[p(Q );a,p] is derived, assume 
m 
that producers initially estimate aggregate output to be QA. The 
corresponding subjective price distribution for the participants 
is F(p!QA) with expected price p(QA), shown in the upper panel of 
Figure l. Similarly, the nonparticipants use price distribution G(v!QA). 
Aggregate output h(QA;a,pm) is AQA in the lower panel or OQ~ in the 
upper panel. Thus, the point A' ~ [p(QA),h(QA;a,pm)] is on the supply 
- e . 
curve, S[p(Q ;a,p )]. The rational expectations equilibrium is 
m 
attained at point E, the intersection of the expected market demand 
curve and the 45 degree line for Q ~ Qe in the lower panel. The 
equilibrium price distribution is F*(p) ~ F(p!Q*). However, the actual 
market price will be either p1 or Pz• depending on the state of the 
world. 
0 
Q 
Q* 
Q* 
Q* 
Q' A 
Figure 1. Rational Expectations and Market Equilibrium 
Q e . 
10 
3. Factor Intensities and Participation 
It is well known that if the production function is linearly 
homogeneous, the choice of production technique depends only on the 
factor prices and not on the level of output. Moreover, if the market 
price is known, the output level of a competitive firm is indeterminate. 
If the market price is uncertain, the output level of a risk neutral 
firm is also indeterminate. However, indeterminacy of the output 
level disappears when the competitive firm is risk averse. Producers 
choose different output levels due to different attitudes toward risk. 
Baron [1970] demonstrated that the output of a competitive firm is a 
decreasing function of the firm's index of absolute risk aversion. 
Policy parameters directly affect participation and production 
decisions. But aggregate supply response affects the price distributions, 
G(v\Q) and F(p\Q). Hence, secondary adjustments are necessary as 
producers revise their price expectations. The indirect adjustments 
may reinforce the direct responses or work against them. However, 
in the latter case the direct responses are likely to outweigh the 
indirect counterresponses. 
Consider, for example, the effects of increases in a and pm 
on the equilibrium land use of the participants, L!· Differentiating 
Li with respect to a and pm gives 
where oL1/oa and oL1/opm represent the direct responses, holding 
expectations Qe constant. The common second term in the brackets 
(7a) 
(7b) 
indicates that as producers adjust their estimates Qe of industry 
output, the price distribution G(v\Qe) and the land utilized L1 
are altered. 
We assume that the indirect effect, when negative, does not 
completely offset the direct effect. This is reminiscent to the 
argument insuring negatively sloped demand curves - despite lack 
ll 
of an ~ priori reason for it - that the negative income effect of an 
inferior good is presumed not to more than offset the substitution 
effect of a price change. Since the equilibrium response and the 
direct response have the same sign, we concentrate on the latter 
and investigate how changes in policy parameters affect participation 
decisions and factor intensities. Of course, in principle, the 
equilibrium responses can always be obtained from (7a) and (7b) or 
similar expressions by adjusting for changes in expectations. If 
expectations adjust slowly, producers are likely to exhibit the 
direct effects immediately after a policy change. 
Participation 
Suppose that producers cannot change their inputs and output, an 
assumption relaxed shortly. Consider a marginal participant i, 
indifferent between participation and nonparticipation, i.e., Pi i ~ . 
An increase in the minimum price results in a rightward first degree 
shift in the distribution G(v\Q) and in the distribution of profit. 
Hadar and Russell [1969] showed that a first degree rightward shift 
in the distribution increases expected utility for all monotone 
increasing utility functions. 
profit Pi of participant i. 
Thus, an increase in p increases CE 
m 
However, the increase in p does not 
m 
12 
i influence CE profit N , if the marginal producer is a nonparticipant. 
Thus, an increase in p reduces nonparticipants' use of land L and 
m 2 
increases the participation rate, L1 /aL. Alternatively, an increase 
in a reduces the effective land price (w/a) and increase participant 
CE profit Pi without affecting nonparticipant CE profit Ni. Thus, 
an increase in a reduces L2 and increases the participation rate,. L1 /aL. 
Next, let producers adjust their inputs in response to changes in 
policy parameters. Then participant CE profits will be even higher 
than with the ouptut restriction. In contrast, the nonparticipants 
will not adjust their output levels and their CE profits will remain 
unaffected, if they stay outside the program. Thus, nonparticipants 
have an additional incentive to join the government· program. 
Differentiating L1 with respect to a and pm gives 
(Sa) 
(8b) 
Land Price and Participation 
Policy parameters also induce changes in the market rental price 
of land, w. Equations (Sa) and (Sb) indicate how changes in program 
parameters shift the land demand schedule L1 , and not the equilibrium 
land use level after an adjustment in the land price. However, it 
can be demonstrated that the same inequalities hold, even when endogenous 
changes in the land price are incorporated. Figure 2 illustrates 
the impacts of an increase in the value of the acreage parameter on 
land use. . The total eligible land L is measured by PN. The demand for 
w 
p 
Figure 2. 
A A' B B' 
Land Allocation between Participants and Nonparticipants 
and Land Price 
w 
N 
the land used by program participants, 11 , is obtained by summing (v- R~)(aq/a1.) horizontally. Due to the acreage restriction, the 
~ ~ 
effective land price is w/\, and not w, for the participants. Thus, 
the total land requirement for the program participants, 1 1/a, is 
obtained by dividing 1 1 schedule by a, thereby moving 11 upward. 
The land demand 1 2 of nonparticipants is obtained by summing 
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(p- Rj)(dq/d1j) horizontally. The intersection of 1 1/a and 1 2 
determines the equilibrium land price, w. At this price, the equilibrium 
quantity of 1 1 is PA and that of 1 2 is BN. The horizontal gap, AB, 
represents the idle land of the participants complying with the 
acreage restriction. 
An increase in the acreage parameter initially shifts the demand 
for the total land requirement for participants, 1 1 /a, downward (not 
drawn). Since a higher value of a increases CE profits of participants 
without altering CE profits of nonparticipants, switching of producers 
to become program participants occurs. That is, producers initially 
outside the program now join the government program. The effect 
of shifting participation status on the demand for land used by 
participants, 1 1 , is captured by (8a). When the switching occurs, 
(311 /aa) is positive and hence both 1 1 and 1 2 shift to the right, 
1l and 12, respectively, as shown in Figure 2. Since 11 shifts to 
the right, the equilibrium land use 1 1 at the new land price can 
decrease only if 1 2 shifts to the left. But 1 2 also shifts to the 
right. Thus, the equilibrium use level 11 must rise with a. That is, 
regardless of the adjustment in the land price, the equilibrium quantity 
of 1
1 
increases as a increases, a11;aa > 0. Thus, the inequality (8a) 
also holds even if the land price is flexible. 
The inequality (8b) shows that an increase in pm also shifts 
both the 11 and L2 schedules to the right. The equilibrium use 
level of L1 also increases with pm' and the inequality (8b) also 
holds even if the land price is permitted to adjust for changed 
participation rate. 
Factor Intensities and Participation 
14 
If a government policy has an acreage restriction, then participants 
will use different factor combinations to minimize their production 
costs. Let lP and N be the group of all participants and nonparticipants, 
respectively. Then each participant i ElP maximizes CE profit and 
satisfies the first order condition 
(v R~)(aq/aK.) - r = 0 
~ ~ 
(v- R~) (aqjaL.) - w/a. = 0 
~ . ~ 
where R.= dR./dq, is the marginal risk premium. Similarly, each 
~ ~ ~ 
(9a) 
nonparticipant jE N maximizes CE profit and satisfies the first order 
condition 
(p (9b) 
Baron [1970] and Sandmo [1971] have shown that a risk averse 
competitive firm produces less under uncertain price than if the 
mean price is known with certainty. Moreover, Hartman [1975] showed 
that the competitive firm minimizes production cost. That is, the 
15 
expansion path is independent of risk aversion. Let MRTS = (3q/3L)/(oq/oK) 
denote the marginal rate of technical substitution of K for L. From 
(9a), for each participant iEF 
MRTSi = w/a.r. 
Likewise, equation (9b) yields for each nonparticipant je: K, 
MRTSj = w/r. 
Since the production function is linearly homogeneous, the 
expansion paths are rays from the origin. Thus, K./L. = k1 for ~ ~ 
(lOa) 
(lOb) 
each nonparticipant iE F, and Kj /Lj = k2 for each nonparticipant j E: K 
Clearly, for the linearly homogeneous production functions, factor 
intensities are independent of risk aversion. Attitudes toward risk 
only influence participation and the level of output. Regardless of 
the level of output, each participant chooses input levels along the 
expansion path k1 while each nonparticipant chooses input levels along 
k 2 , as shown in Figure 3. Moreover, since the isoquants are convex 
to the origin, factor intensities are increasing in MRTS. This 
implies that the common factor intensity k1 of the participants 
decreases as increases, ceteris paribus. Thus, every participant 
uses the nonland input more intensively than every nonparticipant, 
i.e. , k 1 (a) > k 2 , a. < l. 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of the acreage restriction on 
factor intensities. For a given isoquant q = q(K,L), a nonparticipant 
faces the factor price ratio, w/r, and accordingly chooses the expansion 
path k
2
• The isocost curve c
2 
is tangent to the isoquant at 2. 
K 
Figure 
I 
I 
I 
1/ 
I 
/ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I kl 
I 
I 
/~rs1 
Factor Intensities 
~ w/o.r, i E lP 
q = q(K,L) 
L 
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The acreage restriction raises the effective factor price ratio 
of the participant to (w/ar). Thus, the isocost curve c1 , tangent 
to the isoquant at l, is steeper than c2 . Each participant chooses 
(K.,L.) along the common expansion path k1 , depending on their attitude ~ ~ 
toward risk. 
How uoes an increase in the minimum price affect the factor 
intensities? Recall that an increase in the minimum price changes the 
CE marginal revenue, (v R~), of each participant directly and also 
indirectly via a change in the industry output, which in turn changes 
the distributions, G(v\Qe) and F(p\Qe). However, this change in 
CE marginal revenue affects the level of output along the expansion 
path, but does ~ rotate the expansion path. Thus, an increase in 
the minimum price can change the factor intensities only by inducing 
a change in the land price. 
An increase in the minimum price increases CE profits of participants 
without altering those of nonparticipants. Thus, switching of participation 
status may occur. For simplicity, we assume that when a marginal 
producer switches, the quantity of the land input demanded remains 
unaffected so that switching of the marginal participants/nonparticipants 
alone has no appreciable effect on the land price. Eeckhoudt and 
Hansen [1980] have shown that an increase in the minimum price increases 
the output of every risk averse firm. This implies that CE marginal 
revenue, v- R~, and CE marginal revenue product of land, (v- R~)(3q/3L.), 
~ ~ ~ 
of each participant increases with the minimum price. Since every 
participant increases the demand for the program land, L1/a, while 
17 
each nonparticipant does not alter his demand for L., the equilibrium 
J 
land price must rise with the minimum price, i.e., dw/dp > 0. 
m 
Moreover, factor intensities are increasing in the land price, and 
hence in the minimum price. That is, 
ok 1 ap > o. 
2 m 
How does an increase in the acreage parameter affect the factor 
intensities? As the acreage parameter increases, the effective land 
price (w/ar) for a partcicipant declines and the expansion path k1 
(11) 
in figure 3 rotates clockwise, converging to k 2 as a approaches unity. 
Thus, if the land price were constant, each participant would use 
the nonland input more intensively as the acreage parameter a increased. 
The effects of the acreage parameter on the land price is generally 
ambiguous. Assuming that dw/da = 0, we have 
(12) 
18 
4. Supply Response 
To investigate impacts of policy changes for industry output, 
it is necessary to aggregate input demands for the participants and 
nonparticipants separately. For this purpose, we first develop an 
important property of the rational expectations equilibrium. This 
property is also used to investigate the impact of policy changes 
on aggregate CEproducer income in section 5. 
Since each producer is a price taker, the land price w is treated 
as constant; as if the supply of land input were perfectly elastic 
at w. The assumption is appropriate for analyzing firm behavior. 
However, the equilibrium rental value of land, w, is endogenously 
determined by the aggregate land demand and supply schedules. We assume 
that the total eligible land L for the government program is fixed 
in supply. The aggregate land constraint is thus 
1 L --a I L. iE: lP ~ I L. jE H J 0. 
The CE producer income of all participants is 
I Cvq (K., 1. l 
. lP ~ ~ ~E 
rK. 
~ 
Similarly, the CE producer income of all nonparticipants is 
12 - I [pq(K. ,L.) 
j H J J 
rK. 
J 
R .] • 
J 
(13) 
Consider the problem of maximizing the aggregate CE producer 
income, I =r1 + 12 , subject to the land constraint (13). The first 
order conditions are, 
(v R ~) ( 3q/ 3K.) - r ~ 0 
1 1 
(v - R~) (3q/3L.) 
1 1 
- Aja ~ 0, for all iE lP, and 
(p - R~) (3q/3K.) - r ~ 0 
J J 
(p - R ~ )( 3q/ 3L.) 
J J 
- A ~ 0, for all j EN , 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier or the shadow price of land. 
Note that these conditions are identical to (9a) and (9b), when 
w ~A, i.e., the market rental value of land is at its equilibrium 
value A. Recall that identical expectations Qe ~ Q were used for 
19 
the industry output to generate identical price distributions perceived 
by all firms. 4 
Proposition 1: Assume that producers have rational expectations 
but have different attitudes toward risk. Then individual producers 
independently maximizing their expected utilities behave as if they 
jointly maximize the aggregate CE producer income. 
Recall that preducers maximize expected utility if and only if 
they maximize CE producer income. Different attitudes toward risk 
among producers make it difficult to compare and aggregate expected 
utilities. However, CE producer income can be used to compare producer 
welfare under uncertainty. First, CE producer income is the "uncertainty 
counterpart" of producer surplus or qtiasirent under certainty. Since 
20 
the producer receives a random output price, CE producer income is 
obtained by subtracting the risk bearing cost from the expected surplus. 
Second, not only interfirm comparisons but also aggregation of CE 
producer income have - whereas aggregation of expected utilities do 
not - economic meanings. If producers are risk neutral, they are 
jointly maximizing expected producer surplus. If they are risk averse, 
they behave as if they jointly maximize expected producer surplus less 
the risk bearing cost. 
Unlike the producer surplus under certainty, however, CE producer 
income is not always observable since the implicit risk bearing cost 
R. is subjective, reflecting the subjectivity of expected utility. 
~ 
When the market is in long run equilibrium, the CE income and risk 
premium are observable, since the former is exhausted by compensating 
for the cost of the short run fixed input and risk bearing cost. 
Renee, the aggregate risk premium equals expected profit in long 
run equilibrium. 
Aggregation of Risk Premiums and Outputs 
Since we have demonstrated that the industry behaves as if 
producers collectively maximize CE income, and we are interested 
in analyzing aggregate supply response-rather than individual firm 
response-to stabilization policy, we will conjure up a super agent 
representing all producers and investigate its response to changes 
in program parameters. For this purpose, it is necessary to aggregate 
risk premiums and factors. for the participants and the nonparticipants 
separately. 
21 
Note that since the factor intensity of a participant is completely 
determined by (w/ar) , the CE income of a participant can be written as 
where x(k1) = qi/Li is the average yield per acre of land used by the 
participant. Since there is a fixed relationship between the land 
input and output, the former is allocated efficiently among the 
participants if and only if the latter is. Let c(q.) = (rk1/x)q. be 1. 1. 
the total cost and c 1 = rk1/x(k1) be the constant unit production 
cost of the participants. Then the CE income of participant i can be 
rewritten as 
Ii = vql.. - c1q. - R.(q.). 1. 1. 1. (14) 
Consider the problem of allocating outputs among the participants 
to maximize their aggregate CE income. The Lagrangian function is 
given by 
I q. 
. lP 1. l.E 
- c 1 I q.- I R.(q.) + v1 [X- I q.] iE lP 1. iE lP 1. 1. i E lP 1. 
where v1 is the multiplier. The first order conditions are 
v - c1 - R~ - v1 = 0, for all i ElP. 
This implies that marginal risk premiums, Ri(qi), must be equalized 
among all participants, regardless of differences in their attitudes 
toward risk. Similarly, 
R• P· - c2 - j - v2 = 0, for all jsN. 
(15a) 
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average cost of nonparticipants 
and v 2 is the multiplier for the output allocation problem among the 
nonparticipants. The solutions to the first order conditions can be 
written as 
Thus, the group risk premiums are given by 
L R. [q. (X)], 
iE: lP ~ ~ 
L R.[q.(Y)]. 
j>:H J J 
Differentiating R1 (X) with respect to X gives 
Ri (X) = R~ L (dqi/dX) = Ri, for iE:lP 
iE lP 
Similarly, extending the argument for the nonparticipants, 
R2' (Y) = R ~, for j E: H . J . 
We have succeeded in expressing the aggregate risk premium of 
(16a) 
(16b) 
the participants in terms of their total output, rather than individual 
outputs. Moreover, the.marginal aggregate risk premium is also equal 
to the common marginal risk premium of the participants. Similar results 
hold for the nonparticipants. Our next task is to express the aggregate 
output of the participants in terms of their total inputs. The total 
output of the participants is given by 
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Similarly, the total output of the nonparticipant is given by 
Since the participants and the nonparticipants use different expansion 
paths, we distinguish the two group production functions, 
Thus, the aggregate CE producer income can be written as 
The aggregate CE income of all producers is now expressed in terms of 
total, not individual, input demands of the participants and nonparticipants. 
The advantage of (17) is that it can be used to analyze the impacts of 
policy changes on the aggregate supply response and CE producer income. 
Recall from Proposition l that when producers have rational price 
expectations individual expected utility maximization results in a 
market equilibrium in which the aggregate CE income is also maximized. 
The first order conditions for maximization of CE producer income are 
now expressed in terms of aggregate input demands and risk premiums: 
(v-Ri)(oXfoK1) - r = 0 (18) 
(v-R')(oXfoL ) - A/a = 0 l l 
(p-Ri)(OY/OK) - r = 0 
(p-R2)(oY/oL ) - A = 0. 
The solution to (18) gives the input demand functions, 
The aggregate outputs of the two groups and industry output can be 
written as 
= X(a,p) + Y(a,p ). 
m m 
Supply Response 
Recall that a policy change initially affect participation 
and production decisions and hence secondary adjustments are necessary 
if producers are to have rational expectations. Consider the rational 
expectations equilibrium supply response to an increase in the minimum price. 
Differentiating Qe with respect to p gives 
m 
dQe 
dp 
m 
dQe 
+--dp 
m 
where the first term refers the direct response, holding expectations 
constant, and the second term represents the indirect output adjustment 
due to a change in price expectation. Rearranging the terms, we have 
dQe = 
dp. 
m 
25 
If a higher estimate of industry output or a lmver price expectation 
reduces the output of every firm, then dQ/dQe < 0. Alternatively, 
if a higher expectation of industry output increases supply, then 
dQ/dQe > 0. However, when expectations do not adjust instantaneously 
in response to changes in program parameters, the market equilibrium 
will be stable only if dQ/dQe > - 1. Thus, stability requires that 
1 ~ (dQ/dQe) > 0. If the market is stable, then the rational expectations 
equilibrium response and the direct response will always be in the 
same direction. Moreover, in the more likely situation, dQ/dQe < 0, 
the rational expectations equilibrium response will be a fraction of 
the direct response, since the adjustment in expectations partly offset 
the direct response. With this in mind, we now focus on the direct 
response to policy changes. 
The direct responses to changes in program parameters can be obtained 
from (19). Differentiating X with respect to p gives 
m 
(20a) 
since (oL
1
/opm) > 0 by (Sa) and ok1 /opm > 0 by (11). That is, an increase 
in the minimum price increases the output ~f participants. 
Differentiating Y with respect to pm gives 
(20b) 
Since (aL 2/apm) is negative and (ok2/apm) is positive, the effect 
on the output· of nonparticipants ~s ambiguous. Sunnning (20aj and (20b) 
gives 
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Note that y(k 2) = x(k1 (a)) when a= 1. If x(k1 (a)) increases with 
the first bracketed terms are negative. Differentiating ax(k
1
) with 
respect to a gives oaxjaa = x(l - E ) , where E.~=:- (dX/da) (a/x) > 0 
xa h~ 
is the elasticity of the average land yield of the participants with 
respect to the acreage parameter. Observe that Exa = Exk Eka' where 
Exk = (dx/dk)(k/x) and 
ska=- (ak;aa)(a/k) = (%~k)/(U4~TS) .=a 
is the familiar elasticity of substitution of K for 1 for the participants. 
If x(k) = 0 when k = 0, and x(k) is monotone increasing and concave in k, 
then Exk is less than unity. Thus, if the elasticity of substitution a 
is less than or equal to unity, then Exa < 1 and the first bracketed 
terms in (ZOe) are negative. Since the second bracketed term is positive, 
the output effect of an increase in the minimum price is generally 
ambiguous. If the stabilization program has no acreage restriction 
(a= 1), then 1 1 = 1 and the first bracketed term is zero while the 
second is positive. Thus, in the absence of the acreage restriction, 
an increase in the minimum price has a positive supply response. 
Next, consider the effects of an increase _in the acreage parameter 
on supply responses. Differentiating X= 1 1x = (11 /a)(ax) with respect 
to a gives 
(2la) 
Differentiating Y with respect to a and holding A constant gives 
(2lb) 
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Finally, adding (2la) and (2lb) gives 
(2lc) 
which indicates that the effect of an increase in a on the aggregate 
suppoy response is generally ambiguous. Evaluating (21c) at a = 1, 
since x(k1 (1)) = y(k2). If the elasticity of substitution a~ 1, then 
E is less than unity. Thus, as the acreage parameter decreases 
xa. 
from unity, industry output declines. 
Proposition 2: Assume that the elasticity of substitution a ~ 1. Then 
(i) an increase in the minimum price or the acreage parameter 
increases the total output of the participants, but the output 
effect on the nonparticipants is generally ambiguous, and 
(ii) the acreage restriction initially reduces the industry output, 
and in the absence of the acreage restriction an increase in 
the minimum price increases the industry output. 
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5. Producer Income and Price Stabilization 
A principal objective of price stabilization in commodity markets 
is to improve CE producer income by providing more stable prices. 
In this section we analyze the effects of changes in program parameters 
on CE producer income. Since the stabilization program influences 
industry output Q, expected prices can be written as 
v(C! ,p ) = v[Q(C!,p ) ;p ). 
m m m 
Note that when industry output is held constant, v increases with the 
minimum price but is unaffected by changes in a. Changes in program 
parameters affect v also indirectly via a chan3e in industry output. 
In contrast, the expected price of the nonparticipants are affected by 
program parameters only indirectly. 
The CE income of the participants is given by 
This indirect CE income is now expressed in terms of stabilization 
program parameters. The expression for the risk premium, R1 [X(a,p );a,p ] m m 
indicates that the program parameters can affect risk premium directly 
and also indirectly via a change in output X. Regarding the direct 
effect of the program parameters on the risk premium, holding input/output 
constant, we note that (i) an increase in the minimum price results in 
a rightward first degree shift in the distribution of v while reducing 
its dispersion, and hence reduces the risk premium, and (ii) an increase 
in the acreage parameter increases profit and decreases risk premium, 
provided that the participants exhibit diminishing absolute risk 
aversion. Thus, the direct effects on the risk premium are negative 
for both parameters, i.e., 
dRl,_ < 
dpm Q 0, 
3Rll 3a Q < 0. 
The indirect CE income of the nonparticipants is given by 
Changes in program parameters affect the risk premium of the 
nonparticipants only indirectly through changes in output. 
Minimum Price 
Differentiating (22a) with respect to p and using (18) gives 
m 
Recall that the direct effect on risk premium, 3R1/3pm' is negative. 
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An increase in the minimum price directly increases expected price v. 
If the industry output Q increases, the direct impact is partly 
offset. If a government program is to give a consistent signal to 
the participants, expected price~ of the participant must increase 
with the minimum price, i.e., d~/dp > 0. Since an increase in the 
m 
minimum price increases the land 11 used by the participants (by (8b)) 
then the first term in (23a) is positive. Thus, an increase in the 
minimum price increases CE income of the participants. 
Differentiating (22b) with respect to p and using (18) gives 
m 
( 22b) 
(23a) 
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(23b) 
If an increase in the minimum price increases market output, then 
dp/dp is negative. Moreover, an increase in the minimum price reduces 
m 
the land 1 2 used by the nonparticipants (by (Bb)). Thus, CE income of 
the nonparticipants decreases as the minimum price increases. Adding 
(23a) and (23b) gives 
di/dp = x(dv/dp) + Y(dp/dp) - (oR1 /ap ). m m m m (23c) 
The first term is positive, regardless of supply response Q. The 
second term is positive only if dQ/dp is positive. · Thus, an increase 
m 
in the minimum price has an ambiguous effect on the CE producer income. 
Proposition 3: An increase in the minimum price increases CE income 
of the participants. If dQ/dp is positive, an increase in the minimum 
m 
price decreases CE income of the nonparticipants. If dQ/dp is negative, 
m 
an increase in the minimum price increases the aggregate CE producer 
income. 
Acreage Restriction 
Differentiating (22a) with respect to a gives 
(24a) 
The first term is positive by (Ba) and (aR1/aa) is negative. If 
the industry output Q decreases as a increases, then the second term 
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is also positive. In this case, CE income of the participants increase 
with a. However, if dQ/da > 0, then di/da is ambiguous. 
Differentiating (23a) with respect to a gives 
(24b) 
The first term is negative by (8a). If dQ/da is positive, the second 
term is also negative. In this case, an increase in the acreage 
parameter decreases CE income of the nonparticipants. Finally, 
adding (24a) and (24b) and differentiating the land constraint with 
respect to a gives 
di/da 2 - -[icL1/a - (3R1/3a)] + X(dv/da) + Y(dp/da). (24c) 
The brackted term is positive. If the market output increases with 
(dQ/da > 0), then the second and the third terms are both negative. 
If an interior maximum of I exists for a < l, then the acreage restriction 
can increase CE producer income. 
We now investigate the conditions under which the acreage restriction 
initially increases CE producer income. Evaluating (24c) at a = l, 
we have 
di/CfJ. = [AL - 3R1/3a] + Q(d~/dQ) (dQ/CfJ.) 
If the producers exhibit diminishing absolute risk aversion, then 3R1/3a 
< 0. Moreover, d~/dQ < 0 since an increase in industry output results 
in a leftward first degree shift in the price distribution. 
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Proposition 4: Assume that producers exhibit diminishing absolute 
risk aversion. If dQ/da < 0, then di/da > 0, and hence the acreage 
restriction decreases the aggregate CE producer income. 
If the industry output decreases with a, the acreage restriction cannot 
improve the CE producer income. Thus, dQ/da > 0 is a necessary condition 
for an acreage restriction to improve aggregate CE producer income. 
6. Government Cost and Efficiency 
We have sho'<n how the stabilization program parameters influence 
industry output and CE producer income. If price incentives are introduced 
to encourage voluntary participation, the program can be costly to the 
government. Since the government cost is financed by taxes imposed on 
consumers, it is important to control government cost within limits, while 
maintaining a high benefit-cost ratio (Fox [l95lb]). In this section, 
we first investigate how program parameters affect expected government 
cost. Then we show how an efficient stabilization program can be designed 
to maximize CE producer income for a given expected government cost. 
Expected per unit subsidy can be written as 
pm 
G = f (p - p)dF(p\Q) = v - P· 
0 m 
The expected program cost to the government is 
(25) 
If the participation rate is positive, X is also positive. Thus, 
expected government cost is positive if the minimum price is effective, 
i.e., F(p) > 0. 
m 
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Xinimium Price 
Differentiating (25) with respect to pm gives 
ac;ap = (dG/dp )X + e<ax/ap ) . (26) 
m m m 
Recall that 3X/3p is positive by Proposition 2. Differentiating 9(Q;p ) 
m m 
with respect to p gives 
m 
d8/dp = F(p·) + (38/3Q)(3Q/3p ). 
m m m 
Since an increase in market output Q results in a leftward first degree 
shift in the distribution F(pJQ) for a given minimum price, the expected 
per unit government subsidy increases with industry output. If 3Q/3p 
m 
is positive, then d8/dp is also positive. Even if the indirect effect 
m 
were negative, due to a negative supply response, it is not likely 
to offset the direct effect, F(p ). In the anomalous case, an increase 
m 
in the minimum price may give producers a wrong signal, since their 
expected per unit subsidy would be decreasing. Barring this anonomly, 
an increase in the minimum price increases the expected government 
cost, i.e., 3c/3p > 0. 
m 
Acreage Restriction 
Price Incentives not only encourage participation, but also 
increase expected government cost. Government cost can be moderated 
by a suitable acreage restriction. Differentiating (25) with respect 
to a. gives 
ac;aa. = (38/3Q) (3Q/3a.) + G(ax/aa.). ( 2 7) 
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Since (3X/3a) > 0, an increase in a increases expected government cost, 
if the supply response is negative. Recall that (3Q/3a) is negative 
when evaluated at a= l (Proposition 2). 
Proposition 5: Assume that the elasticity of substitution a ~ l. Then 
(i) the acreage restriction initially reduces expected government 
cost, and 
(ii) an increase in the minimum price increases expected government 
cost. 
Efficiency 
The notion of efficient stabilization program has been developed 
by Theil [1965] and Fox, Sengupta and Thorbecke [1966]. Since the 
government cost is borne by consumers, we focus on ·cE producer income 
and expected government cost. Define an efficient stabilization program 
as one that maximizes CE producer income at a given expected government 
cost. With a voluntary program, the government decision problem is 
to choose a and p to 
m 
maximize 
subject to 
I(a ,p ) 
m 
0 c - C(a,p ) = o 
m 
where C0 is a constant government cost. The first order conditions 
are given by 
(oifoa) - s (3C/3a) = o 
car tap ) - s cac/ap ) = o 
m m 
(28) 
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With empirical information on the technical and behavioral relationship 
that underly CE producer income and government cost, condition (28) 
can be solved for the optimal or efficient program parameters. 
Even without the empirical information for an explicit solution, 
the above optimization problem can provide useful insights. The 
solution is illustrated in Figure 4. First, consider the locus Aa 
along which participation is.zero. To the right (left) of this 
"zero" participation curve, program output X is positive (zero). 
Next, consider the locus Ba along which the expected per unit subsidy 
G is zero. Differentiating G(Q;p ), subject to Q = Q0 along the zero 
m 
participation curve, yields 
This implies that G increases-with p along the zero participation 
m 
curve Aa, although expected government cost is still zero, due to 
zero participation. Thus, Aa lies above Ba. The area to the right 
of Aa defines combinations of (a,p ) that yield a higher CE producer 
m 
income than with no program. However, expected government cost is 
also positive in this region. 
The efficiency locus or the contract curve, aed, in Figure 4, 
shows how a and p should change to maximize CE producer income with 
m 
increasing expected government cost. These points are determined by 
tangency between the isocost and isoincome curves. For example, e 
in Figure 4 is the tangency point between the isocost curve C* and 
the isoincome curve I*. Note that the multiplierS = di/dC 0 , which 
(29) 
A d 
B I* C* 
a 
0 l 
Figure 4. An efficient program with a maximum price (pM = b). 
measures the marginal efficiency of government spending, varies 
along the contract curve. If producers were risk neutral, then the 
marginal efficiency of government spending would be less than unity, 
since the program distorts resource allocation. If producers are 
risk averse, however, government program reduce the risk bearing 
cost and hence will be higher than if producers are risk neutral. 
If the government has a fixed (expected) budget, then the 
benefit-cost ratios, I/C, can be compared to choose the commodity 
markets for price stabilization. Moreover, if the government were 
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to stabilize the prices of several commodities, the associated 
expenditure will be efficiently allocated if the multipliers are 
equalized. If not, reallocating government resources from a commodity 
market with a lower multiplier into another with a pigher multiplier 
can improve producer welfare. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigated the effect of a stylized stabilization 
program for supply response and producer income. The risk averse 
producers are assumed to face random market demand. The commodity 
is nonstorable and the government uses a direct· price subsidy to 
assure the minimum price for program participants. However, to 
reduce industry output and improve producer income, an acreage 
restriction is imposed for participating producers. 
We dmonstrated that if producers have rational expectations 
they behave as if they jointly maximize the aggregate CE producer 
income. This property of the rational expectations equilibrium 
permits aggregation of input demands, outputs and the risk premium 
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for both participants and nonparticipants. An increase in the minimum 
price or the acreage parameter encourages participation, and increases 
the output of the participants. But, the output effect on the 
nonparticipants is generally ambiguous, due to endogenous changes 
in the land price. 
A simultaneous increase in the minimum price and a decrease in 
the acreage parameter can increase CE producer income. The trade-off 
is an increase in expected government program cost. An efficient 
stabilization program can be designed to maximize CE producer income 
for a given expected government cost. Moreover, the multiplier for 
the constrained optimization problem can be used to compare efficiency 
of government programs. If the government has a fixed budget for 
stabilization, this efficiency analysis can be useful in selecting 
commodity markets for government intervention. 
FOOTNOTES 
l. See Turnovsky [1978], Newbery and Stiglitz [1981) and Just and 
Hallam [1982] for extensive references. 
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2. Kawai [1983) introduces a futures market into the model. If the 
speculators in the futures are risk neutral, expected (discounted) 
spot price will be equal to the present futures price and no 
producers will participate in government programs with acreage 
restrictions. However, if the speculators are risk averse, the 
futures market does not provide actuarially fair price insurance. 
3. Since the production function is linearly homogenenous, the 
input demands are also decreasing in the absolute risk aversion 
index. 
4. If producers have different expectations, the aggregate CE income 
is not meaningful. Although producers maximize their own CE 
incomes, based on their subjective expectations, all other firms 
with different expectations appear to be behaving suboptimally. 
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